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Abstract
This paper briefl y describes some features of the situation of the Spanish economy after 
fi ve years of crisis, a task which is easier now that this period can be analysed from a 
certain perspective. The crisis prompted a substantial readjustment of the main Spanish 
macroeconomic aggregates, affecting the level and composition of GDP, employment 
and the balance sheet position of the institutional sectors. During this period some of the 
imbalances that built up during the upturn have been corrected and several key variables 
are currently at around the average European levels. All told, the legacy of the crisis, in terms 
of the magnitude of unemployment and of the still high levels of indebtedness, makes for a 
complex outlook and suggests that the recovery will be gradual and not free of uncertainty. 
This uncertainty mainly affects the functioning of the economy’s adjustment mechanisms, 
particularly those working through the channels of competitiveness and of private sector 
balance sheets. Despite the depth of the crisis in Spain, the progress made in the reforms 
on various fronts is, on balance, signifi cant. From the perspective provided by the analysis 
of the crisis in this paper, supply-side policies will have to play a major role in the current 
phase of the cycle to enable the recovery to proceed fi rmly. 
Keywords: Spanish economy, economic crisis, adjustment, rebalancing, internal devaluation, 
competitiveness, balance sheet position, indebtedness, reforms.
JEL classifi cation: E60, E65, F32, G01, H12.
Resumen
En este trabajo se trata de recapitular algunos rasgos de la situación de la economía española 
tras cinco años de crisis, ejercicio que se benefi cia de poder analizar este período con cierta 
perspectiva. La crisis ha supuesto un sustancial reajuste de las grandes cifras macroeconómicas 
españolas, tanto en términos del nivel y la composición del PIB y del empleo como en términos 
de la posición fi nanciera de los sectores institucionales. Durante este período se han corregido 
algunos de los desequilibrios que se acumularon durante la etapa expansiva, y diversas 
variables clave se sitúan en la actualidad en unas cotas similares a las europeas. Con todo, 
el legado de la crisis en términos de la magnitud del desempleo o de los todavía elevados 
niveles de endeudamiento confi gura un panorama complejo y apunta a una recuperación 
gradual de la actividad, que no está exenta de incertidumbres. Estas afectan, principalmente, 
al recorrido pendiente de los mecanismos de ajuste de la economía, en particular el que 
transcurre a través del canal de la competitividad y el que lo hace mediante el ajuste de la 
situación patrimonial del sector privado. A pesar de la profundidad de la crisis, el recuento de 
los avances de las reformas adoptadas en diversos frentes ofrece un balance signifi cativo. 
Desde la perspectiva que suministra el análisis realizado en este trabajo, las políticas de oferta 
deben desempeñar un papel fundamental en la fase cíclica actual, con el fi n de consolidar la 
recuperación.
Palabras clave: Economía española, crisis económica, ajuste, reequilibrio, devaluación 
interna, competitividad, posición patrimonial, endeudamiento, reformas.
Códigos JEL: E60, E65, F32, G01, H12.
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1 Introduction
The fi rst half of 2013 marked the fi fth year of economic crisis in Spain against a background 
characterised by the diffi culties of developed countries in overcoming the legacy of the great 
recession and by the vicissitudes besetting the euro area, partly due to the defi ciencies of its 
institutional framework which became apparent in this period.
The crisis at global level began to manifest itself from 2007, particularly in the United 
States and other countries directly affected by the subprime mortgage crisis. At that time the 
Spanish economy was in its fourteenth year of continuous growth, had lowered its unemployment 
rate to 8% and was running a budget surplus. However, that long period of expansion had been 
overly reliant on increasing private-sector debt – largely fi nanced with funds from abroad – and 
on a concentration of resources (both fi nancial and material) in the construction sector, and 
had given rise to a signifi cant external defi cit and high external debt, signalling a gradual loss of 
competitiveness of Spanish production. Moreover, the continual recourse to debt concealed, 
in the boom years, the failure of Spanish market structure and institutions to conform to euro 
area requirements. The gradual correction of those imbalances marked the development of the 
crisis in Spain and, together with the scope and depth of the reform programme under way, will 
infl uence the extent and pace of the return to growth.
Based only on economic activity data, the fi rst fall in the level of GDP in Spain was in 
2008 Q2 and the last in 2013 Q2. The latest information points to a steadying of activity in the 
second half of the year, although the basis for a sustained recovery still continues to be weak 
and remains surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty. In this period of 21 quarters, the 
Spanish crisis passed through of number of phases of varying intensity and nature.
The world fi nancial crisis hit the Spanish economy when it was already showing 
symptoms that the growth pattern which had prevailed for more than a decade was petering out. 
The sudden tightening of fi nancial conditions and the rising perception of risk triggered a severe 
real estate crisis which confronted over-indebted economic agents with drastically changed 
expectations and marked falls in the value of their wealth. The standstill in real estate activity and 
the decrease in employment in the construction and the construction materials sectors were 
accompanied by a wider decline in domestic demand, which the Spanish economy was unable 
to counteract through an increase in external demand, given the problems of competitiveness 
which had been building up.
The extraordinary fi scal and monetary stimuli used in many industrialised countries after 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 helped to detain the global depressionary 
spiral, although in Europe the expansionary momentum of public debt in some countries posed 
uncertainties as to the adjustment capabilities of some euro area economies and as to the 
defi ciencies of the euro area’s institutional framework when faced with bouts of instability of 
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that nature and severity. These defi ciencies, which were eloquently refl ected in the dramatic 
developments of the Greek crisis, hampered the recovery of activity because they focused 
the attention of international investors on the sustainability of public fi nances, penalising the 
countries perceived as more fragile, which had to implement fi scal adjustment measures when 
the cycle continued proving to be very weak. In Spain the sharp growth of the budget defi cit 
from 2008 and the resulting dynamic induced in public debt despite GDP ratios initially below 
those of the euro area, put Spain in the group of vulnerable economies.
The macroeconomic crisis together with the superposed sovereign debt crisis gave 
rise to a vicious circle of tightening fi nancial conditions and deteriorating confi dence which 
aggravated the situation of demand and employment, and prompted an additional weakening 
of bank balance sheets which affected credit institutions unevenly. This phase of the crisis 
became particularly serious in 2012 when the emergence of redenomination risk in the euro 
area exacerbated the Spanish public debt tensions and accelerated the net outfl ow of funds, 
triggering a balance of payments fi nancing crisis. To address the lack of confi dence in the Spanish 
economy and break the vicious circle between banking and sovereign risk, it was necessary to 
resort to an EU fi nancial assistance programme to recapitalise the segment of credit institutions 
showing most weakness.
The European fi nancial support, the acceleration of adjustments and reforms in the 
Spanish economy and the commitment by the ECB to address the risk of break-up of the euro 
through the outright monetary transactions programme contributed to stabilising the situation 
from summer 2012. A year later, Spain’s GDP has stopped falling, after a year and a half of 
continuous decline, and net infl ows of fi nancing from abroad have been recorded again.
The economic policy actions over these fi ve years have been numerous and large-
scale. At national level, measures have been taken in the fi nancial, fi scal and structural spheres.1 
In the monetary policy fi eld, the ECB has gradually adapted its monetary policy stance to the 
exceptional challenges posed over these years and has made intensive use of its non-standard 
tools.2 Finally, the euro area crisis has required a thorough revision of the euro area’s institutional 
framework and governance, which has affected numerous aspects of the functioning of the area. 
Notable for its broad scope is the decision to set in train a banking union, which will foreseeably 
help to re-establish confi dence in the soundness of the banking system and overcome the 
fragmentation of the fi nancial markets.3
Among the numerous lines of analysis and thought engendered by such a turbulent 
period, many reported in different works,4 this article seeks to recapitulate certain features of the 
1 See, inter alia, tables in the annex to and Box 1.3 of the 2012 Annual Report of the Banco de España
2 See Malo de Molina (2013).
3  See De Grauwe (2011), Malo de Molina (2011), Pisany-Ferry (2012), Banco de España (2013), Fernández de Lis (2013) 
and Gual (2013).
4  See, for example, Banco de España annual reports (2009-2012), FEDEA (2010), Blanchard et al (2012), Ortega and 
Peñalosa (2012) and Viñals (2013).
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situation of the Spanish economy after fi ve years of crisis. Obviously it has the benefi t of being 
able to analyse this period from a certain perspective hitherto inaccessible given the profusion 
of impacts and spillovers produced by this crisis and the unpredictability of many of those 
developments.
This article is structured in fi ve sections including this introduction. Section 2 below 
describes some stylised facts on the development of the crisis. Section 3, which is not intended 
to be exhaustive, analyses the adjustment of the construction sector, the balance sheet position 
of the private sector, the external imbalance, the labour market, the public fi nances and the 
relative level of economic welfare. Section 4 looks at the management of economic policy over 
this long period from the standpoint of its contribution to correcting imbalances and, lastly, some 
conclusions are drawn which place emphasis on the challenges awaiting us.
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2 Stylised facts on the development of the Spanish economic crisis
The economic crisis in Spain has been severe. In the euro area, it has only been harsher in 
the countries subject to international assistance programmes (such as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal). Thus, in this fi ve-year period, Spanish GDP has decreased by 7.5 pp, although 
perhaps the measure best illustrating the seriousness of the crisis is to be found in labour 
statistics: employment has decreased by 19% since 2008 and the unemployment rate has 
tripled to stand currently at 26% of the labour force.
During the course of this period, we can distinguish different phases in the rate of 
adjustment of activity and in the contribution of its determining factors. An initial characterisation 
of the successive phases through which the Spanish economy has passed in these last fi ve 
years can be obtained from an analysis of the behaviour of the output gap with respect 
to potential GDP. As seen in Chart 1, from 2009 the output gap has been negative and 
has widened practically uninterruptedly, to around 3 pp in 2013. Only in 2010, coinciding 
with the slight recovery of activity in that year, was there a small turnaround in this process. 
However, it should be stressed that this approach is not free from problems because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the estimation of potential output in the context of the prolonged 
economic crisis.5
Alternatively, the stages of the crisis can be delimited by applying the standard defi nition 
of a recession based on the sign of the rate of change of GDP. Accordingly, this long period can 
be divided into three phases.6 The fi rst stage, running from 2008 Q2 to end-2009, saw activity 
5  The estimated growth of potential output has been sharply revised downward in Spain from levels exceeding 3% in the 
pre-crisis years to near-zero growth in the crisis years. An estimate of the potential growth of the Spanish economy can 
be found in Hernández de Cos, Izquierdo and Urtasun (2011) and a discussion of the effects of the crisis on potential 
output is given in European Commission (2013).
6  Successive revisions of the National Accounts time series have altered the starting date and length of the various 
recessionary periods. According to the original dates, the fi rst recession began in 2008 Q3 and the second in 2011 Q4. 
The latest available estimates have brought forward these starting dates by one and two quarters, respectively.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
SPANISH GDP DURING THE CRISIS CHART 1
-2.0 
-1.5 
-1.0 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 PHASE 1  PHASE 2  PHASE 3 
GDP 
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change 
% 
-4.0 
-2.0 
0.0 
2.0 
4.0 
6.0 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
OUTPUT GAP 
% 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1304
fall sharply (the level of GDP decreased by 5 pp). The second stage, running from the beginning 
of 2010 to 2011 Q1, saw a certain stagnation of activity, since the level of GDP barely rose by 
1 pp. From our present perspective of the period as a whole, this phase merely represents 
a pause before the subsequent recession. Indeed, the third phase is the second dip of the 
double-dip recession and, on the information currently available, lasted from 2011 Q2 to 2013 
Q3 (see Table 1 of the annex), in which GDP again fell sharply (more than 3 pp in cumulative 
terms). These periods are fairly similar to those identifi ed by analysing the behaviour of the 
output gap over these years. These phases are also observed in the euro area, with very 
similar timing, although, compared with Spain, the euro area recovered appreciably in the 
intermediate phase and its activity fell off more mildly in the fi nal phase (see Chart 2). The 
differences between Spain and the euro area are much more signifi cant as regards the 
behaviour of employment.
These three periods have features in common, such as the persisting downward 
trend of domestic demand, the positive contribution of the external sector, the continuous 
job destruction or the downtrend in house prices, but others marked the differences in the 
trajectory of each stage (see Chart 3). Such is the case of the fl uctuating support to activity 
provided by the public sector or by fi nancial conditions, or of the varying sensitivity of prices 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
SPANISH AND EURO AREA GDP AND EMPLOYMENT DURING THE CRISIS CHART 2
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and wages to the unfavourable cyclical situation. The patterns of balance sheet adjustment 
and deleveraging by fi rms and households have also changed over these years.
The fi rst period saw the sharpest decrease in activity, and also in employment (-9%). In 
this period budgetary policy adopted an openly countercyclical stance, with notable increases 
in government consumption and investment, tax cuts and higher transfers to the private sector, 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
CONTRIBUTION OF DEMAND COMPONENTS TO GDP GROWTH CHART 3
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which temporarily sustained household disposable income. Employment in non-market services 
increased (by 3%), in contrast to the fall in employment in the market economy as a result of the 
inertia of the worker hiring mechanisms of general government. This fi scal policy stance, along 
with the sharp fall in the voluminous tax revenues from the real estate sector and, more generally, 
the signifi cant cyclical impact of the recession, made for an exceptional surge in the budget 
defi cit by 11 pp of GDP in less than two years.
Despite the expansionary budgetary policy, the notably higher uncertainty derived from 
the rapid deterioration of the labour market and of fi nancial conditions substantially constrained 
the spending of agents (both business investment and private consumption), so the household 
saving rate soared to a historical high (see Chart 4). This development, along with the fall in 
residential investment, meant that households again became net lenders in 2009,7 after having 
built up an excess of investment over saving over a long period. The balance sheet position of 
fi rms also changed radically because their traditional net borrowing was cut back markedly. 
Analysis on the non-fi nancial private sector as a whole reveals that the turnaround in its net 
borrowing was sizeable, since it shrank by 17 pp of GDP in a period of a year and a half. The 
sharp decrease in private spending helped to reverse the upward trend in net borrowing of the 
nation, which diminished by nearly 6 pp of GDP between 2008 Q2 and 2009 Q4 in four-quarter 
cumulated terms (to 4.4% of GDP in 2009).
The second phase of the crisis witnessed the fi rst steps to bring the public defi cit 
back under control, against a background of change in the fi nancial markets’ perception of 
the vulnerability of some euro area countries (most of them on the euro area periphery) as a 
result of the Greek crisis, which broke out at the end of 2009 (see Chart 5). In this phase the 
Spanish budget defi cit decreased by 2 pp of GDP, although the fi gure is larger if measured in 
terms of the implicit structural effort. To do this, some of the expansionary fi scal measures of 
HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME AND SAVING RATE CHART 4
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
7  Since these variables are usually analysed on an annual basis, we discuss here the four-quarter cumulated fi gures up to 
the start and end of each phase into which the crisis period is divided.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1304
the previous phase were reversed and public-sector wages were cut substantially (see Table 2 
of the Annex). Private-sector wages did not react to the same extent and the process of job 
destruction continued, albeit at a slower rate. Household disposable income fell substantially, 
but this fed through only partially to their consumption decisions, so the saving rate declined 
markedly. Firms continued cleaning up their balance sheets and, for the fi rst time since the start 
of monetary union, began to generate fi nancing capacity. This may have also been the result of 
their growing diffi culty in obtaining foreign fi nancing as the spread of the sovereign debt crisis 
heightened tensions in the wholesale fi nance markets. In this period, non-fi nancial corporations 
reduced their debt for the fi rst time, although, as in the case of households, the debt to GDP 
ratio remained at a level not far from that recorded at end-2009. The nation’s net borrowing 
decreased, albeit very slightly, due to the rise in imports.
Many factors played a signifi cant role in the double-dip recession in the Spanish 
economy from mid-2011. A basic element in that phase was the balance of payments crisis 
between the summers of 2011 and 2012. This development refl ected, in turn, a severe loss of 
confi dence in the Spanish economic outlook and led to a substantial tightening of the fi nancing 
conditions of the private sector, against a broad backdrop of great uncertainty as to the viability 
of the euro area as an increasing number of countries required external fi nancial support and the 
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España. 
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fi rst decision was taken on Greek debt restructuring. The balance of payments in this period was 
close to equilibrium, but in the resident sectors other than the Banco de España there were large 
outfl ows of fi nancing (€200 billion, almost 20% of GDP), which were offset by an increase in the 
Banco de España’s liabilities for a similar amount, due to the greater recourse by Spanish banks 
to Eurosystem liquidity tenders (see Table 1).8 The tensions eased from September 2012 once 
the European fi nancial assistance programme for Spanish banks was approved and the ECB 
announced it stood ready to intervene in the markets through outright monetary transactions 
(OMT) to forestall any doubts over the irreversibility of the euro.9,10 
This external fi nancing crisis weakened Spanish banks’ balance sheets and also 
affected the availability of funds to the private sector, particularly at the banks whose solvency 
had been most seriously damaged, as was the case of savings banks. Consequently, the 
process of deleveraging, which had begun timidly in 2010, accelerated sharply (corporate debt 
was reduced by €195 billion and household debt by €74 billion).11 
In this stage fi scal policy was tightened, and more rigorous procedures to control 
budgetary slippage in the various general government sub-sectors (such as the new Budgetary 
Stability Law12 or the obligations derived from the Supplier Payment Plan) were implemented. 
The aim was to redress the unsustainable path of the budget defi cit.
Total Excl. Banco de España Banco de España
2008 Q2-2009 Q4 122 80 42
2010 Q1-2011 Q1 53 48 5
2011 Q2-2013 Q2 9 -234 243
2008 Q2-2013 Q2 184 -106 290
Last 12 months -22 92 -114
€bn Change % of GDP Change
2008 Q1 -849 -79.7
2009 Q4 -982 -133 -93.8 -14.1
2011 Q1 -961 21 -91.8 2.0
2013 Q2 -955 6 -93.4 -1.7
Change 2013 Q2-2008 Q1 -106 -13.8
International investment position
Cross-border ?nancial ?ows (€bn)
EXTERNAL FINANCING OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY DURING THE CRISIS TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
8   See Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
9   Thus, in the most virulent period of the balance of payments crisis in Spain, which ran from July 2011 to August 2012, 
outfl ows of fi nancing in other resident sectors amounted to €356 billion, equal to one-third of Spanish GDP.
10  Gros and Alcidi (2013) compare the adjustment of euro area economies to a “sudden stop” with the experience of 
Central and Eastern European countries.
11  It should also be noted that a portion of that deleveraging was effected by cleaning up bank balance sheets through 
the recognition of bad loans.
12  See Hernández de Cos and Pérez Garcia (2013).
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Employment decreased considerably in the second dip (9%), especially if the adjustment 
already made previously is taken into account, with job losses in all sectors, including, for the 
fi rst time since the crisis began, in non-market services. The fall in employment and the greater 
drain of resources by general government through higher taxes and lower transfers led to a 
further drop in household disposable income, which substantially reduced private consumption. 
Despite this, the saving rate again decreased and at end-2012 stood at its lowest level in recent 
years, signalling the gradual erosion of households’ resilience to income shocks without radically 
changing their consumption pattern [see Arce et al. (2013)]. This reduction in saving also meant 
that households’ net lending decreased. By contrast, fi rms resorted, as in the previous stage, 
to internally generated funds to clean up their balance sheets, reduce their debt and raise their 
fi nancing capacity. Once again, the adjustment of domestic demand favoured the correction of 
the external balance, which at mid-2013 swung to net lending for the fi rst time since the end of 
the last century, in an amount equal to 1.4% of GDP in four-quarter cumulated terms.
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3 Some features of the readjustment of the Spanish economy between 2008 and 2013
As noted in the preceding section, the crisis prompted a substantial readjustment of the main 
Spanish macroeconomic aggregates, affecting the composition of GDP on the demand and 
supply sides and impinging on the fi nancial position of the institutional sectors. In particular, 
it changed the composition of activity, in that the dynamism of domestic demand moderated 
signifi cantly (above all in construction investment) and the continuous recourse to external saving 
was reversed. This section summarises the process of readjustment and its impact in terms of 
employment, public fi nances and the relative level of economic welfare.
3.1 Changes in the composition of GDP
The behaviour of GDP, as estimated using its demand-side determinants, indicates that the crisis 
brought a sharp fall in domestic demand, with a corresponding rise in net external demand (see 
Charts 6 and 7). Thus, over these fi ve years, domestic demand dropped by 16% in real terms, 
with decreases in all items. The decline was most signifi cant in investment, but also sizeable in 
private consumption, which fell by 10%. In terms of the structure of output, the most substantial 
change was in construction investment, whose weight in GDP expressed in current prices 
dropped to half, i.e. a ratio of around 10% of GDP, similar to that for the euro area as a whole.
The share of residential investment in GDP fell from 12% in 2007 to 4.4% in 2013 Q2, 
its lowest for the last three decades.13 The decrease in the number of housing starts was even 
sharper, since in the twelve months up to June 2013 the construction of 40,000 houses was 
started, scarcely 5% of those commenced in 2006.14
13  This ratio is even lower than that for the euro area, which is understandable because the large housing overhang 
requires residential investment to remain for some time below what is probably its medium- and long-term level.
14  This means that a relatively high percentage of residential investment currently consists of its housing rehabilitation 
component, which has been less affected by the economic crisis.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
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The real estate collapse substantially affected house prices, which in nominal terms fell 
by nearly 30% from their peak until 2013 Q2. In real terms, the size of the adjustment is 36%, 
which far exceeds those in previous real estate cycles. As shown by Chart 8, this means that the 
gap which opened up between house prices in Spain and in the euro area in the boom period 
has closed considerably. Household wealth has been affected by this price correction, since 
housing wealth in mid-2013 was around four times GDP, compared with nearly six times GDP 
SOURCE: INE.
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FUENTES: Bloomberg, 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.  
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in 2007. Although, due of its nature, that housing wealth had limited liquidity, the high housing 
overhang further reduced the ability of households to realise the assets locked up in that saving, 
which is an additional factor restricting the spending power of households. Non-residential 
construction also declined substantially, since on top of the downturn in business investment 
there was a sharp fall in government investment, which, as explained below, was one of the main 
drivers of fi scal consolidation in Spain.
The sharp halt in this sector’s activity had a considerable effect on employment because 
construction is very labour intensive. Construction sector employment came to account for 
nearly 14% of total employment in 2007, twice as high as in the euro area, with nearly 2.5 million 
people employed. In 2013 Q2 the persons employed in this sector fell short of one million, with a 
ratio of 6% of total employment, similar to that of other European countries (see Chart 8 again). 
As will be seen below, the skills of those workers make them diffi cult to place in other activities.
Analysis of the behaviour of GDP from the supply side shows that the crisis had an 
uneven impact across economic sectors. The most notable changes in the composition of GDP 
were the share accounted for by the value added of construction decreased and that of services 
increased, with more expansionary performances by information and communication services, 
business services, consulting and transport. The weight of the value added of industry in GDP 
remained steady at around 16%, although that ratio conceals a very substantial change in the 
type of manufacturing fi rms comprising that sector, since those which survived the crisis are 
more productive and open to trade. In this respect, it may be surprising that, despite the increase 
in the weight of exports in GDP, the share of industry – which is the main producer of exportable 
goods – has not risen in Spain during these years.15 Two possible reasons for this paradox are 
the sluggishness of domestic demand – most notably the collapse of residential investment, 
which acts as a source of demand for industrial products – and the growing outsourcing of some 
activities to the services sector [see Tiana (2012)].
3.2  Correction of the external imbalance and adjustment through the competitiveness 
channel
The ongoing substantial recourse to external saving which accompanied the upturn of the 
Spanish economy was one of its main sources of vulnerability and marked the unsustainability 
of a pattern of growth based on the persistent expansion of external debt. The economic crisis 
halted that trend of rapid deterioration of the external fi nancial position, although scarcely any 
headway has been made in reversing that trend.
Indeed, these years have seen a signifi cant reduction of the external imbalance, which 
swung from a defi cit of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to a surplus in 2013 (see Table 2). This is 
a considerable correction, but the crisis has been extremely severe and has strongly affected 
domestic demand. It is therefore diffi cult to distinguish to what extent this improvement in the 
15  In any event, it should be noted that the weight of industry in Spain is not lower than in other European countries, 
except Germany. Thus the ratio in France and Italy is similar to that in Spain.
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external balance is attributable solely to cyclical or structural factors. Evidently this correction is 
partly explained by a surge in exports, a development indicative of the improved competitiveness 
and greater presence abroad of Spanish fi rms related to the sluggishness of the domestic 
market. Exports increased by 14% in real terms in that period and, at current prices, rose 
from a share of somewhat more than one-quarter of GDP at the start of the crisis to one-third 
of GDP at mid-2013, representing an increase of 8 pp. Also notable was the smaller relative 
weight of exports to the euro area, a sign of the growing geographical diversifi cation of sales 
abroad, which underpinned the buoyancy of exports at a time when world growth was tilting 
progressively towards the emerging economies.16
In this fi ve-year period, real imports decreased by 18%, although at current prices their 
weight in GDP scarcely dropped by 1 pp. It can be assumed that this weakness of imports has 
a large cyclical component, although possibly the purchases abroad in some segments are 
being partially replaced by domestic production. Overall, the behaviour of exports and imports 
refl ects the fact that the adjustment channel of competitiveness has begun to function, albeit 
late, as evidenced both by the improved competitiveness of national production (which foments 
exports and the substitution of imports) and by the cut-back in purchases abroad derived 
from the contraction in demand and activity. All told, the size of the effort yet to be made is 
considerable. Indeed the Spain’s long period of accumulating external defi cits led to a rather 
high and persistent negative international investment position (above 90% of GDP, far removed 
from the threshold of 35% of GDP set in the excessive macroeconomic imbalance procedure), 
16  See Peñalosa (2012).
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
2008 Q1 2013 Q2
2009 Q4/ 
2008 Q1
2011 Q1/ 
2009 Q4
2013 Q2/ 
2011 Q1
2013 Q2/ 
2008 Q1
1. Goods trade balance (fob) -8.8 -1.3 4.9 -0.7 3.4 7.6
    Goods exports 18.1 23.5 -2.5 3.9 4.0 5.4
    Goods imports 27.0 24.8 -7.4 4.6 0.6 -2.2
2. Services trade balance (fob) 1.9 3.5 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5
    Services exports 8.7 10.5 -0.3 0.7 1.5 1.8
    Services imports 6.8 7.1 -0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3
3. Goods and services foreign trade balance
(3 = 1 + 2)
-6.9 2.2 5.0 -0.2 4.3 9.1
4. Primary income balance -2.7 -1.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 1.6
5. Net current transfers -0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
6. Current external balance
(6 = 3 + 4 + 5)
-10.4 0.7 5.7 0.2 5.2 11.1
7. Net capital transfers 0.5   0.7   0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
8. Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) 
of the nation (8 = 6 + 7)
-10.0 1.4 5.6 0.4 5.3 11.4
REST-OF-THE-WORLD ACCOUNT 
% of GDP (in four-quarter cumulated terms) 
TABLE 2 
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so it is necessary to combine an external defi cit and activity growth to reduce that dependence 
on external saving.17 This underscores the importance of competitiveness as a variable which 
may make the achievement of these two objectives compatible.
The competitive position of a country depends on numerous factors, many of them 
qualitative (quality, innovation, trade policies, etc.). A solid competitive position requires progress 
in those factors, which ultimately means that productivity policies have to be prioritised. At the 
same time, the adjustment of relative costs and prices is a basic determinant of competitiveness 
in a monetary union because it is what, in the absence of nominal devaluation mechanisms, 
enables the real exchange rate to be varied and allows factors of production to be reallocated 
from non-tradable to tradable goods sectors.
A signifi cant and growing part of Spain’s foreign trade is with non-euro area countries. 
This makes it necessary to consider the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against 
17  It should be taken into account that even when the external accounts are balanced or in surplus, a high level of 
foreign liabilities requires frequent roll-over of fi nancing, which is sensitive to market sentiment and to the prospects of 
economic recovery or of success in the economic policy measures taken.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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the currencies of our main trading partners. In this respect, the euro has depreciated slightly 
against those currencies in the last fi ve years, although that trend has reversed in recent 
months (see Chart 9).
However, to bolster exports and limit the penetration of imports, Spanish prices and 
costs need to fall relative to those of our competitors, which would restore the competitiveness 
lost since inception of the euro area. In this process of improvement of competitiveness, the 
advances made in the crisis years were uneven. It is true that infl ation has become more sensitive 
to the cyclical downturn since the outset of the crisis [see Álvarez and Urtasun (2013)]. However, 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
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looking at the HICP, the large difference built up in the period 1999-2007 has decreased only 
partially. To some extent this is due to the rises in energy prices, indirect taxes and administered 
prices which have been a component of fi scal consolidation strategy in Spain. In the case of 
the GDP defl ator, the difference relative to the euro area has been systematically negative from 
2008, although that has not offset the deterioration in prices with respect to the boom years 
(see Chart 10).
In the case of compensation per employee, the largest adjustment in the period as a 
whole was in the non-market sector through the public-sector wage cuts in certain years and 
the decision not to increase wages in others, as a result of which the level in 2012 was similar to 
that in 2007. By contrast, compensation per employee in the private sector increased by around 
10% in the fi ve years as a whole. In relative terms, wages only began to grow more slowly 
than in the euro area from 2010. Partly owing to this wage rigidity and to the severity of the 
recession, fi rms reduced their unit labour costs (ULCs) by shedding labour, i.e. by sharply raising 
productivity. In this respect, the most signifi cant reversal of losses in competitiveness vis-à-vis 
the euro area has been precisely in terms of this latter variable. In any event, notably in recent 
quarters the higher wage fl exibility stemming from successive labour reforms has allowed ULCs 
to be contained, with a higher contribution from wage moderation and a lower contribution from 
the productivity gains emerging as a result of job destruction (see Table 3 of the Annex for a brief 
description of the labour market reform measures adopted in recent years).
In short, the buoyancy of exports (and perhaps some of the sluggishness of imports) 
is being favoured by the gains made in competitiveness, although the process of domestic 
devaluation has been slow and depended excessively on job destruction, as analysed below.
3.3 Changes in the balance sheet position of the private sector
The aforementioned changes in the composition of GDP have their counterpart in the 
substantial variations in the fi nancial position of the institutional sectors. The reduction in the 
nation’s net borrowing by 11 pp of GDP from the beginning of the crisis was accompanied by a 
movement of opposite sign in the public and private sectors: in non-fi nancial corporations and 
households, net lending increased by 18 pp of GDP, mainly as a result of the sharp adjustment 
in investment and also because of the efforts by both sectors to clean up their balance sheets 
and reduce their leverage; by contrast, the public sector went from a surplus of nearly 2% of 
GDP in 2007 to a defi cit of 6.8% in 2012 (not counting the impact of fi nancial support) (see 
Chart 11).
These readjustments by the private sector bring Spanish households and fi rms closer 
to the pattern in the euro area (see Chart 12). Thus, the fact that Spanish households were 
net borrowers in 2007 was exceptional from the European standpoint, where households are 
usually net lenders. The decrease in residential investment in Spain, the ratio of which to GDP 
in 2007 was nearly 7 pp higher than in the euro area, allowed the fi nancing capacity of Spanish 
households to return to a level similar to that in European countries. In the case of non-fi nancial 
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corporations, the high net borrowing during the boom, which reached nearly 11% of GDP in 
2007, was also much higher than that of European fi rms due to the combination of a much 
higher investment ratio and much lower business saving in Spanish fi rms. During the crisis, 
business investment expressed as a percentage of GDP decreased in Spain (to a ratio of around 
12%), while business saving increased, in this case to ratios exceeding those in the euro area. 
As a result, the net lending which began to emerge in 2010 contrasts with the persistence of 
a certain net borrowing by European fi rms. The fi nancing constraints in Spain and the need to 
make headway in the process of deleveraging may have made for a sharper adjustment of fi rms’ 
balance sheet positions in Spain.
Despite this improvement in the balance sheet position of fi rms and households, the 
debt ratios of the private sector remained high, partly because of the weakness of their income. 
At mid-2013 corporate debt represented 107% of GDP,18 10 pp less that at the beginning of 
2008, and the debt ratio of households was 80%, 5 pp lower than at the start of the crisis (see 
Table 3). That is to say, the debt of non-fi nancial corporations and households decreased by 
18  Part of that debt is explained by the process of globalisation of Spanish multinationals, which were particularly active 
in the years preceding and immediately after the creation of the euro area.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España. 
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15 pp of GDP to 186% at mid-2013.19 The stabilisation of GDP and its subsequent recovery will, 
moreover, accelerate that reduction of the ratio.20
3.4 The changes in the labour force, employment and unemployment
After fi ve years of continuous employment destruction the labour market has undergone a far-
reaching transformation. The supply of labour has, on aggregate, been notably resilient, although 
this has changed somewhat in 2013 as the labour force has declined appreciably. That said, in mid-
2013, the labour force was 22.7 million, similar to its level in 2008 Q2, against a background of less 
dynamic demographic developments than in the years leading up to the crisis, as a result of the fall 
in the foreign population from 2010. This result, which contrasts with the labour force contraction 
in other downturns, when the discouragement effect or large-scale early-retirement programmes 
predominated, is mainly attributable to stabilisation of the participation rate at around the high level 
(60%) reached in 2007 (see Chart 13). The continuous rise in the female participation rate until 
very recently (in 2013 Q1 it fell for the fi rst time since the start of the crisis) has offset the decline 
19  These debt fi gures include bank loans, fi xed-income securities issued and external credit, but not loans granted by 
general government (which in 2012 represented around 3% of GDP), which however do form part of the debt variable 
included in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in the EU. The threshold above which prívate-sector debt is 
considered excessive under this procedure is 133% of GDP.
20  In 2013 Q3 household and fi rm debt was reduced by an additional €32 billion.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
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in the male participation rate over these years as well as the decline in the participation of foreign 
workers. Lying behind this behaviour may be found factors linked to the need to offset the loss of 
income in the household unit (known as the “second income” effect), but also structural factors, 
since in recent decades in Spain patterns of female participation have become progressively more 
similar to those of men, something that previously only occurred at the highest levels of education.
In comparison with the relative resilience of the labour supply, the decline in employment 
has been sizeable, amounting to almost 20% from its peak, to a level of 16.5 million in 2013 
Q2. The adjustment of employment has been more intense among employees with temporary 
contracts, the number of which fell by 40% from 2007 Q3, accounting for 65% of the total reduction 
in dependent employment during these years. This feature of the adjustment was especially 
important in the early stages of the crisis, given the failure of employment conditions to adapt to 
the cyclical change and the lower costs of dismissal for workers with temporary contracts. Also, 
the weight of full-time employment has fallen since the crisis, while there has been a considerable 
increase in part-time employment (the part-time ratio has increased by 5 pp since 2008, to 17%).
Against this background, unemployment has grown very sharply over the last fi ve 
years (peaking in 2013 Q1 at over six million), the rate rising to 27.2% in 2013 Q1, although it 
subsequently fell back to 26% in Q3. In this case too there are signifi cant differences between 
groups: the hardest hit by job losses have been the youngest (the rate of unemployment for 
16-24 year-olds stood at 55%) and lowest skilled (with a rate of unemployment of 40%), these 
groups being especially affected by the destruction of temporary employment. At the same time, 
the crisis has involved a considerable increase in the average duration of unemployment for all 
segments of the population. Long-term unemployment (i.e. unemployment lasting for more than 
one year) stood at 58% of total unemployment in 2013 Q3, compared with 21% at the start of 
the crisis. The duration of unemployment is particularly high for some groups, such as young 
people, older workers and the less educated, with the consequent risk of exclusion from the 
labour market21 (see Chart 14).
21 See Font and Puente (2013).
SOURCE: INE and Banco de España.
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3.5 The structure of public revenue and expenditure 
The increase in the budget defi cit up to 2009 and the subsequent consolidation process have 
been accompanied by signifi cant changes in the paths of public expenditure and revenue and 
their composition. These changes stem from factors of different natures: the impact of the 
prolonged downturn; the fi scal measures adopted, in some cases temporarily; and the effects 
of the sovereign debt crisis.
In 2012, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP, excluding the impact of state aid to credit 
institutions, was 4.8 pp higher than in 2007 (3.4 pp in terms of primary expenditure), standing at 
44% (see Chart 15). Current expenditure increased by more than 7 pp of GDP over this period. 
One third of this increase was attributable to the weight of contributory pensions, one quarter to 
the increase in unemployment benefi ts and a somewhat smaller percentage to the increase in 
interest payments. The compensation of employees increased to a lesser extent (by 1 pp of GDP), 
having increased until 2009 and fallen thereafter. This expansionary path of current expenditure was 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Excluding aid to ?nancial institutions.
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partly offset by lower public investment, the only component of public expenditure to have fallen in 
weight since the start of the crisis (it has been halved to 1.7% of GDP), although in this case too 
the reduction was concentrated in the period 2010-2012. If the analysis of general government 
expenditure is limited to the budgetary consolidation phase that began in 2010, a somewhat 
different view is obtained, since the public expenditure ratio in this three-year period, excluding the 
impact of the fi nancial aid, fell by 2.3 pp of GDP (3.4 pp in the case of primary expenditure).
The ratio of public revenue to GDP fell, in turn, by 4 pp between 2007 and 2012, to 
37.1%, despite the fact that from 2010 onwards there were increases in the rates of most taxes 
(personal income tax, VAT and excise duties). More than half of this decrease is explained by 
the loss of corporate income tax receipts, which barely responded to the changes in the tax 
until 2012, and a further 25% to the lower receipts from transfer and stamp tax, which is linked 
to second-hand housing transactions. Other indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties) explain the 
remaining 25%. Finally, both personal income tax receipts and social contributions had a similar 
weight in 2012 to that in 2007, although they fl uctuated around this level during the period. 
The deterioration in domestic demand, with very severe falls in household consumption and 
residential investment (the basis of indirect tax revenues), and the negative employment trend 
(which underpins personal income tax and social contributions) lie behind this reduction in the 
tax burden in Spain, a development that is proving diffi cult to reverse. In this case too, if the 
analysis is restricted to the fi scal consolidation phase, the ratio of revenues increased moderately 
until 2012, and somewhat more strongly in 2013.
These changes have led to modifi cations in the structure of public expenditure and 
revenue over these years, some of which, as seen above, merely refl ect the impact of cyclical 
factors. This may be the case of a signifi cant part of the loss of revenue recorded over the last 
fi ve years. However, the changes in the structure of production and spending accompanying 
the readjustment of the Spanish economy will entail lower revenue levels in future than in the 
period before 2007. Given the inertia displayed by certain components of public expenditure, 
this means that the fi scal consolidation drive needs to be sustained.22 In the medium term, the 
restructuring of public fi nances will be facilitated by the increase in revenue that may arise from 
reform of the tax system and from the containment of public expenditure that should stem from 
general government and pension system reform.
In this respect, the measures implemented since 2010 have enabled the budget defi cit 
to be cut by 4 pp from its peak in 2009, to 6.8% of GDP in 2012, although this still represented 
a deterioration of 9 pp from 2007. The primary structural balance has, in turn, been reduced by 
7 pp since 2009, to a level that is still well above the thresholds established by EU obligations. 
The defi cit path during these years was infl uenced by the impact of aid for the banking system, 
causing a faster rise in public debt, which reached 92% of GDP in 2013 Q2, and thus in interest 
payments, which in 2013 are expected to absorb almost 2 pp of GDP more than in 2007 [see 
Gordo et al. (2013)].
22 See Hernández de Cos et al. (2011).
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3.6 The changes in the relative level of economic welfare
Since the beginning of the crisis, Spain’s per-capita income has fallen by almost 5%, causing 
its position relative to the euro area to worsen by nearly 8 pp, to stand at 88.7% of the average 
income of this group of countries in 2012, down from a peak of 96.2% in 2007, according to 
the latest Eurostat estimate (see Chart 16). Despite this signifi cant setback, the fi gures show 
that most of the progress in economic welfare in Spain since European integration has been 
maintained (in 1985, per-capita income relative to the countries that would subsequently make 
up the euro area was 74%). In terms of its determinants,23 the decline in the level of real 
per-capita GDP in recent years has been exclusively due to the poorer behaviour of the rate 
of employment in Spain, which stood 14 pp below the average euro area rate in 2012 (see 
Chart 17). This was partly offset by the more favourable performance of productivity, discussed 
above, which closed the negative gap that had opened up during the years before the crisis, 
and has reached a level slightly above that of the euro area.
However, from the viewpoint of the determinants of productivity, it should be emphasised 
that the strong growth in this variable was due to the notable increase in the capital/employment 
ratio which, in conjunction with the sectoral changes indicated, seems to be giving rise to a 
pattern of specialisation that makes less intensive use of labour. This type of specialisation 
is more consistent with the adjustments required by an increasingly competitive world, but 
poses signifi cant challenges for Spain because of its high employment rate. Accordingly, an 
extraordinary effort needs to be made to increase the training (and thus the productivity) of the 
unemployed and to press ahead with sectoral reallocation, so that a pattern of income growth 
can be achieved which mobilises all the labour available.24
SPANISH GDP PER CAPITA AND COMPARISON WITH THE EURO AREA (a) CHART 16
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23  GDP per capita is obtained by multiplying the proportion of the population of working age by the rate of employment 
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24 See Izquierdo, Puente and Font (2013).
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SOURCES: Ameco and Banco de España.
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4 Economic policy during the crisis 
The economic crisis in Spain has been unusually deep. With the perspective of the six years 
that have passed since the outbreak of the global fi nancial crisis, the severity of the recession 
in Spain can now be seen to be the consequence of a combination of numerous causes. 
The starting position of the Spanish economy in 2007 was characterised by certain profound 
macro-fi nancial imbalances that had built up over the expansionary phase and that heightened 
vulnerability to fi nancial shocks, particularly if these occurred during cyclical corrections. In 
addition, the growing complexity of the crisis, as the links between the macroeconomic and 
fi nancial problems became stronger, was aggravated by the fl aws that emerged in the single 
currency project. All this made it diffi cult to diagnose the full extent of the problems and to 
articulate the necessary economic policy responses, which were frequently late and in some 
cases insuffi cient.25 The delay in the policy reaction worsened the problems of confi dence 
and ultimately meant that the response had to be greater when the margin for manoeuvre 
had become signifi cantly narrower. Albeit with delay, the adoption of adjustment and reform 
policies, both at the euro area and Spanish economy level, is establishing conditions that will 
allow the legacy of the crisis to be overcome and a path of recovery initiated.
As seen in the previous section, readjustment of the Spanish economy is proceeding 
via two basic channels: competitiveness (which for the fi rst time in recent economic history is 
taking place through a process of internal devaluation) and the balance sheet of the private 
sector. However, these mechanisms have not been friction free and they have not always been 
the most rapid or effi cient either, for a number of reasons. Focusing on the purely domestic 
ones, fi rst, the institutional framework of the Spanish economy in 2007 (including the labour 
market institutions, product market regulation, the structure of the public sector and the fi nancial 
system) was not conducive to the adjustment of the imbalances or the reallocation of resources 
towards activities with better prospects, which has meant that the impact of the crisis has been 
concentrated on employment. Second, it is necessary to consider the gradualism in economic 
policy management, which affected the speed of adjustment of the economy. Misdiagnosis and 
the internal resistance of agents and sectors affected by the possible reforms contributed to 
delays in taking decisions, which had to be made in a very adverse environment. In some cases, 
expectations that the recession was going to be less prolonged or that recovery was close 
undermined the urgency of the reforms.
Fiscal policy management suffered from some of these problems. Having been clearly 
expansionary in the early stages of the recession, it had to become very contractionary in 
the second phase of the crisis in order to counteract the major budgetary deterioration that 
had built up over previous years and to combat the effects of the sovereign crisis, which 
was especially virulent in countries considered to be vulnerable. In any case, as seen above, 
the stabilisation capacity of fi scal policy in the early stages of the crisis was very limited. A 
25  Infl uenced in some cases by the changing recommendations of international institutions during these years.
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substantial part of the expansionary stimulus leaked into saving and increases in wages and 
public-sector employment would soon be seen as unsustainable. In addition, the stimulus 
may have contributed to ambiguous signals regarding the size of the crisis and the most 
appropriate adjustment channels.
The fragility of public fi nances in the middle of the sovereign debt crisis forced a 
sudden change in the fi scal policy stance in 2010, at a diffi cult time from the viewpoint of the 
economy’s cyclical situation, which was exacerbated by other contractionary forces stemming 
from tightening fi nancial conditions and deleveraging by fi rms and households. In addition, 
as the recession continued and the effectiveness of the measures adopted was reduced the 
restrictive fi scal drive had to be stepped up. Finally, the public policy reversal may have generated 
uncertainty in economic agents’ decision-taking, exerting an additional contractionary impact on 
spending.26
At the same time, the sequence of the adoption of structural reforms and, in particular, 
the gradualism in the application of the labour market reform measures set the pattern followed 
by the internal devaluation process, both as regards its intensity and the factors driving it. The 
initial failure of labour costs to react meant that in the fi rst phase of the crisis fi rms responded 
to the abrupt contraction of demand by resorting heavily to labour shedding. The implications 
of an adjustment of this type have been widely documented: it amplifi ed the effects of the 
crisis, adversely affected disposable income and slowed down the necessary process of internal 
devaluation. In fact, until very recently the latter process hinged almost exclusively on the 
productivity increases generated by the contraction in employment. Following the labour market 
reform of 2012, which was more ambitious than previous reforms, the importance of wage 
adjustment as a factor driving internal devaluation increased, although employment continued 
to be affected by the severity of the cyclical conditions and by the lags with which the structural 
changes are passed through to the economy.27
The scope of the product market reforms and their sequence during these years were 
not always adequate to address the critical situation. This delayed the pass-through of cost 
moderation and productivity increases to prices. The cyclical sensitivity of infl ation has increased 
during the crisis, but price rises have reduced the purchasing power of households, so that 
their real disposable income fell by 11% between 2008 and 2013 (while in nominal terms it 
stagnated). Over the period as a whole, the CPI increased by 11%, although energy prices and 
rises in taxes and regulated prices explained most of this increase.
The Spanish economy must simultaneously undergo a process of deleveraging, 
especially in mature sectors, and reallocate resources towards new sectors with a greater 
projection. For this to happen, product and factor market reforms, in the broad sense, are 
essential. In recent years various initiatives have been launched in this respect, but they have 
26  Hernández de Cos and Jimeno (2013) discuss fi scal policy transmission mechanisms and, in particular, their 
asymmetric impact, depending on the situation of fi nancial tension or the state of expectations.
27  See Izquierdo, Lacuesta and Puente (2013).
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not always been implemented as rapidly as would have been desirable and their fi nal formulation 
has, on occasions, been less ambitious than initially intended. A recovery in activity will require 
obstacles to entrepreneurial initiative to be removed, market unity through the elimination of 
regional administrative barriers strengthened, sectors liberalised and an increase in the size of 
Spanish fi rms promoted, while avoiding the “threshold effects” that arise when fi scal, legal or 
administrative requirements are imposed beyond a certain size.
The restructuring of the banking system has been a key element of the economic policy 
response, since the fragilities that emerged in one of its sub-sectors have been at the heart of the 
economy’s confi dence and fi nancing problems. This aspect of economic policy lies beyond the 
specifi c focus of this paper, but it should at least be mentioned that the necessary restructuring 
has also faced diffi culties, not unrelated to the specifi c institutional features of the savings bank 
sector, where the problems were concentrated. As already indicated, the prolongation and 
worsening of the crisis fi nally forced the authorities to use public funds to recapitalise the most 
vulnerable institutions at a time when public fi nances were very weak, so that Spain eventually 
had to appeal to the EU, in 2012, for fi nancial assistance. The programme agreed with the 
European authorities has dispelled the doubts overhanging the sector, although full normalisation 
of fi nancing fl ows will require completion of the European reforms, with a fully credible Banking 
Union, and progress in the complex process of deleveraging the Spanish economy.
Despite the halting rhythm of economic policy actions, signifi cant progress has been 
made overall with reforms on various fronts. Had these reforms been adopted earlier or as part 
of coordinated efforts their impact would have been more effective.
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5 Conclusions and challenges
Despite the depth of the crisis in Spain, the progress made on reforms on various fronts is, on 
balance, encouraging, although not free from important risks and challenges. During this period 
some of the imbalances that built up during the upturn have been corrected and several key 
variables are currently very close to average European levels. The weight of the construction 
sector, in terms of both GDP and employment, has been considerably reduced, as have house 
prices, the external balance is in surplus, and private-sector debt ratios have begun a gradual 
decline.
All told, the legacy of the crisis, in terms of the magnitude and persistence of 
unemployment, the massive housing overhang and the still high levels of indebtedness of 
households, fi rms (in certain sectors in particular) and, above all, of general government, gives 
rise to a complex outlook. This suggests that the recovery will be gradual and shrouded in 
uncertainty.
In the fi rst place, this uncertainty affects the functioning of the economy’s adjustment 
mechanisms. With regard to the stimulus from competitiveness, the drive to adjust the real 
effective exchange rate needs to be sustained. In terms of the unit labour costs of the economy 
as a whole, the cumulative depreciation during these fi ve years has been equivalent to that 
achieved with the peseta devaluations between 1992 and 1995; however, as seen in this 
article, the increase in the external and internal competitiveness of domestic production has 
still not been suffi cient to bring about a recovery in employment. A closely related question is 
to what extent the structural reforms implemented will be capable of ensuring more balanced 
contributions from costs, productivity and prices to the internal devaluation process. For the 
latter to have lasting effects it must stem from increases in productivity based on effi ciency gains 
in productive processes, but, above all, given the high rate of unemployment, the containment 
of prices, mark-ups and wages that offsets the productivity slowdown must be sustained as the 
labour market recovers.
Given the fragility of domestic demand (owing to the delicate net-worth position of 
the private and public sectors) and the large negative external position, the buoyancy of net 
external demand is fundamental to economic recovery. This requires that the competitiveness 
indicators go beyond what might be considered a situation of apparent equilibrium (which some 
analysts estimate as the beginning of Stage Three of EMU in accordance with certain measures 
of the real effective exchange rate). The need to attain suffi ciently competitive price and cost 
levels is underlined by the high sensitivity of imports to the buoyancy of fi nal demand. This 
sensitivity clearly apparent in the second stage of the crisis, when barely any progress was made 
correcting the external defi cit and infl ation rebounded.28
28  See IMF (2013).
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Against this background, the stabilisation of consumer prices is essential as a 
mechanism to safeguard the purchasing power of households without having to resort to 
pressure on wage costs. The initiative to eliminate references to the CPI in public-sector prices 
and contracts, along with the lower importance of the infl ation rate in wage and pension setting, 
will help to improve the competitiveness of domestic production and will contribute notably to 
putting Spain on a path of price stability over the coming years.
At the same time, households and, above all, fi rms have been making headway 
improving their balance sheet position, an adjustment that is leading to a reduction in the 
high levels of debt assumed before the crisis. Both phenomena are having a short-term 
contractionary impact on private-sector spending which, in the current circumstances, cannot 
be offset by government action. In this context, the question arises as to when the point will have 
been reached where balance sheet clean-up and private-sector deleveraging allow a boost to 
consumption and investment, and these components can begin to have a positive impact on 
activity, reinforcing the positive contribution from the external sector. For this to happen, it will 
be increasingly necessary to combine the decline in the debt ratios with the maintenance of a 
suffi cient supply of credit for solvent agents.29 This process, already under way, is especially 
important to ensure adequate fi nancing is available for innovative business projects and export 
industry expansion plans, thereby enabling resources to be reallocated from traditional activities 
towards those linked to the production of tradable goods and services.
An additional source of uncertainty relates to the diffi culty of determining how much 
of the decline in activity has ultimately affected the foundations of growth and, therefore, the 
economy’s ability to expand in the medium and long term. This is a diffi cult question to answer, 
the analytical instruments available having been clearly inadequate for the task.30 Potential 
output estimates have been revised signifi cantly downward in recent years, casting doubt on 
the true impact of the crisis on the productive base. This doubt extends to a variable that plays 
an essential role in future growth capacity, structural unemployment, the real magnitude of which 
cannot be easily estimated either.
From the perspective provided by the analysis of the crisis in this paper, supply-side 
policies ought to play a major role in the current phase of the cycle. Given the impossibility of 
using demand policies, it is supply-side reforms that, by removing the obstacles hampering 
business initiative, can boost investment, employment and exports.
29  Ayuso (2013) analyses measures to promote the fi nancing of fi rms, and especially of SMEs.
30  Borio (2012) discusses some of the analytical challenges the international fi nancial crisis has highlighted, including that 
relating to the estimation of potential output.
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ANNEX
2009 Q4/
2008 Q1
2011 Q1/
2009 Q4
2013 Q2/
2011 Q1
2013 Q2/
2008 Q1
1. National ?nal consumption expenditure -2.0 0.1 -6.3 -8.1
    1.1. ???????? ??????????????? ?????????????????? ????????????? -4.8 -0.7 -5.9 -11.1
    1.2. General government ?nal consumption expenditure 6.6 2.3 -7.2 1.2
2. Gross capital formation -22.9 -5.7 -14.9 -38.1
    2.1. Fixed capital -22.9 -6.8 -14.9 -38.9
        2.1.1. Capital goods -26.7 9.2 -4.2 -23.3
        2.1.2. Construction -22.6 -14.5 -21.6 -48.1
            Housing -29.2 -15.9 -19.2 -51.9
            Other construction -14.5 -13.1 -23.6 -43.2
        2.1.3. Other products -6.8 18.7 -1.2 9.4
3. National demand (1 + 2) -7.9 -1.2 -8.1 -16.4
4. Exports of goods and services -9.6 15.0 10.0 14.4
    4.1. Goods -8.7 18.1 11.5 20.2
    4.2. Services -11.3 9.2 6.6 3.2
        4.2.1 Other services -9.1 11.0 7.7 8.7
        4.2.2 Tourism -14.0 6.9 5.1 -3.3
5. Final demand (3 + 4) -8.3 2.0 -4.0 -10.2
6. Imports of goods and services -18.1 6.9 -6.1 -17.9
    6.1. Goods -19.6 9.1 -7.1 -18.5
    6.2. Services -12.3 -0.3 -2.5 -14.8
        6.2.1 Other services -10.8 0.3 -1.5 -11.9
        6.2.2 Tourism -20.1 -3.4 -8.5 -29.3
Contribution of net external demand (a) 3.3 1.8 5.0 9.6
7. Gross domestic product (5 - 6) -5.0 0.7 -3.3 -7.5
    7.1 Agriculture and ?sheries -5.5 7.9 -13.9 -12.2
    7.2  Industry and energy -10.4 11.2 -4.6 -4.9
        7.2.1 Energy -5.1 20.5 -1.5 12.7
        7.2.2 Industry -11.6 8.8 -5.5 -9.1
    7.3 Construction -13.6 -17.2 -17.0 -40.6
    7.4 Services -1.6 2.0 -0.2 0.2
        7.4.1 Market services -3.5 2.3 -0.9 -2.2
        7.4.2 Non-market services 4.6 1.0 1.8 7.4
    7.5 Net taxes on products and imports -6.8 -4.4 -7.3 -17.5
 Memorandum item
    Total economy GVA -4.8 1.2 -3.0 -6.5
    Market economy GVA -6.6 1.2 -4.0 -9.3
Total economy employment -9.2 -1.9 -9.0 -19.0
    Market economy employment -11.9 -2.7 -10.3 -23.2
    Non-market economy employment 2.8 1.2 -4.2 -0.3
Unemployment rate (level) 18.8 21.3 26.3 26.3
Unemployment rate (change) 9.2 2.5 5.0 16.6
GDP GROWTH AND ITS COMPONENTS BY PHASE 
(Rates of change) 
TABLE A.1
 
 
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a Contributions to GDP growth.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Public expenditure
    Employment
Replacement rate limited to 
15% (with exceptions)
Replacement rate limited to 
10% (with exceptions)
No replacement, with 
exceptions
No replacement, with 
exceptions
Compensation 
per employee
3.5% increase 3.5% increase
No wage increase. 5% 
wage reduction in July
No wage increase
No wage increase. Increase in 
hours. December extra 
payment eliminated
No wage increase. 
Reduction in holidays
???????????al 
consumption 
expenditure
Expenditure cut: immediate 
action plan
Cut in purchases by 
regional and local 
government: May 2010 
package
Education and health 
measures
Education and health 
measures
Pensions, etc.
Initial increase in 
line with 
projected 
?????? ???
Adjustment for 
??????on deviation
Initial increase in 
line with 
projected 
?????? ???
Adjustment for 
???ation deviation
Initial increase in line with 
pro????????????? ???
????????????????????? ??
deviation
Pension freeze, except for 
minimum pensions
Initial increase in line with 
pro????????????? ??????????ent 
??????????on deviation
Increase in excess of 
pro????????????? ?
    Unemployment
Increase in 
be??????
(“PREPARA” 
programme)
Review of bene?????or over 45s. 
Reduction in National Public 
Employment Agency 
contribution 
Percentage reduction from 
sixth month
Car purchase 
incentive scheme
Reduction in employment-
promotion rebates
??????????ehicle incentive 
programme (”Plan PIVE”)
???????????????????????????
programme (”Plan PIVE”)
    Public 
investment
State fund for 
local investment
Public investment 
reduction
Public investment 
reduction
Public investment reduction Public investment reduction
    Other
State fund for 
reinvigorating the 
economy
State fund for local 
environmental sustainability
Public revenue
Personal 
income tax
Tax relief for 
births ("Plan 
CUNA").
€400 deduction
€400 deduction eliminated
Elimination of tax relief for 
births ("Plan CUNA").
Increase in rates > 
€120,000
Increase in rates
Elimination of house-
purchase deduction for new 
purchases. Increase in 
withholdings on professional 
activities and savings. 
Elimination of house-
purchase deduction 
compensation 
Corporate 
income tax
Partial payments brought 
forward
Partial payments brought 
forward. Limits imposed on 
deduc?? ??????????????????????
and goodwill
Limits on amortisation 
deduction
Wealth tax
Reduction in 
rates to zero
Reintroduced
    VAT
Consolidation in 
the returns of 
corporate groups
Increase in 
refunds for 
monthly 
declaration
Rate increase in July
Extra-low rate applied to 
housing
Rates increased and products 
rec????????
Housing taxed at low rate
Excise duties 
and other taxes
Rate freeze
Rates on 
hydrocarbons 
and tobacco 
raised
Rates on tobacco raised
Rates on hydrocarbons and 
tobacco raised. University fees 
increased
Rates on hydrocarbons and 
tobacco raised. New taxes 
on electricity production and 
storage
Property tax Rates increased
Social 
contributions
Maximum contribution base 
increased. Inclusion in base 
of payments in kind
Subsidies
FISCAL MEASURES 2008-2013 TABLE A.2
SOURCE: Authors.  
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
43
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 O
C
A
S
IO
N
A
L N
.º 1304
SOURCE: Authors.
a During this period the scope of the social security contribution rebates for certain contracts were reduced and modi?ed: focus on training, apprenticeship and entrepreneurship contracts for young persons.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hiring (a)
Extension of groups eligible for employment-
promoting contracts
Limitation of term of contract for a speci?c task or 
service to three years and of temporary contract 
renewals
Training and apprenticeship contract extended to 
under 30s
New contract to support entrepreneurs for ?rms 
with fewer than 50 workers, and groups to whom 
training and apprenticeship contract applicable 
extended
Re-establishment of the prohibition on the 
renewal of temporary contracts
Elimination of the requirement to have completed 
studies within the previous 5 years to be eligible 
for a work-experience contract
New 6-month temporary  contract for under 30s 
with less than 3 months' experience
Collective bargaining
Possibility of agreeing an opt-out from the 
provisions of the sectoral agreement at the ?rm 
level, irrespective of their content
Possibility of amending certain working 
conditions when this contributes to preventing a 
negative performance by the ?rm or to improving 
its situation
Precedence of ?rm-level agreements over higher-
level agreements, unless there is a clause to the 
contrary in an agreement at state or regional level
Precedence of ?rm-level agreements, with any 
????????????????? in higher-level agreements 
null and void
Further speci?cation of conditions for opting out 
of higher-level agreements 
Possibility of unilateral amendment by the ?rm of 
employment conditions when this improves upon 
the minimum conditions established in the 
agreement
Limitation of automatic extension of the term of 
the agreement to one year
Dismissal procedures
Rede?ning of the reasons for objective dismissal 
including the existence of actual or projected 
losses, or persistent decline in the level of 
revenue
Gradual increase in the cost of dismissal for 
temporary contracts between 2012 and 2015
Reduction in compensation for unfair dismissal to 
33 days' pay per year worked, subject to a 
maximum of 24 months' pay (previously 45 days 
and 42 months' pay)
Elimination of payment of wages for the duration 
of the procedure 
Rede?nition of the reasons for objective 
dismissal, with a year-on-year decline in ordinary 
revenue or sales for three consecutive quarters 
being suf?cient
Elimination of administrative authorisation for  
redundancy programmes
TABLE A.3LABOUR MARKET MEASURES AND OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS 2009-2013 
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Unemployment 
bene?ts
Replacement of unemployment bene?t 
for persons subject to an application for 
contract suspension or short-time 
working
Extraordinary unemployment bene?t for 
workers not entitled to unemployment 
allowance who have exhausted their 
contributory bene?t
Unemployment bene?t for workers 
subject to an application for short-time 
working, irrespective of the size of the 
?rm 
Unemployment bene?t in training 
contracts
"PREPARA" programme. Assistance 
payable for 6 months to unemployed 
persons who have exhausted their 
unemployment bene?t and who 
undertake to participate in active 
employment and job-search policy 
activities
Reduction of the amount of contributory 
unemployment bene?t from 60% to 50% 
of the regulatory base from the sixth 
month of unemployment
Increase in the minimum age for receiving 
the special allowance until retirement age 
from 52 to 55, and cancellation of the 
special 6-month allowance for the over 
45s 
Stricter rules for calculating income to 
determine eligibility for unemployment 
allowance 
Restriction of the group of bene?ciaries of 
re-insertion scheme income
Extension of the possibilities for capitalising 
unemployment bene?t for under 30s who use 
the amount to make a contribution to the 
share capital of a newly established 
commercial entity
Active policies and 
labour market 
intermediation
The National Public Employment 
Service's branch network is strengthened
Private for-pro?t entities are authorised to 
carry out labour-market intermediation 
activities
Actions to improve the employability of 
groups affected especially seriously by 
the crisis
Inclusion of unemployed persons in 
training activities targeted at persons in 
employment
Plan for external relocation through 
authorised relocation ?rms in applications 
for contract suspension or short-time 
working
Private entities permitted to participate in 
the design and planning of the vocational 
training sub-system for employment
Temporary Employment Agencies (ETTs) 
may act as placement agencies for 
permanent employment
ETTs may execute agreements to make 
workers available to other ?rms under the 
terms of a training and apprenticeship 
agreement, the ETT being responsible for 
supervising the training
LABOUR MARKET MEASURES AND OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS 2009-2013 (cont´d)
Passive and active employment policies 
TABLE A.3
SOURCE: Authors.  
Self-employed persons aged under 30 who
do not employ anyone may continue to receive 
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improving the quality of education and the Law on professional services and associations.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Other structural 
measures
Various laws were amended to adapt 
them to the law on the ta?ing up and 
pursuit of service activities. Many 
activities are affected: professional 
services, industry and contruction, 
transport, information and 
communications, etc.
The Urban Leasehold Law and the Civil 
Procedure Law were amended to foster 
house rentals through increased legal 
certainty.
Actions to expedite the formation of 
companies and reduce administrative 
burdens.
New Retail Trade Law which reduces  
the requirements at regional level for the
 setting up of new establishments 
(overriding reasons of general interest).
Sustainable economy law: it removes 
obstacles to improving the quality of the 
regulation and reform of regulatory 
bodies so as to strengthen their 
independence.
A government spending rule is 
introduced whereby the increase in 
spending may not repeatedly equal each 
year the medium-term growth rate of 
nominal GDP.
Reform of the pension system: the 
retirment age is gradually raised, the 
number of years on which the pension is 
calculated is increased and a 
sustainability factor is included.
The principle of budgetary stability is 
recognised at constitutional level: limits 
on the government de?cit and 
government debt are written into the 
Constitution.
The constitutional reform is implemented 
through the Organic Law on Budgetary 
Stability and Financial Sustainability: it 
sets quantitative limits on the budget 
de?cit (it prohibits regional governments 
from running structural de?cits), 
government expenditure (which may not 
exceed nominal potential growth) and the 
government debt ratio (60% of GDP).
The regulation of the retail sector is eased 
(liberalisation of the licence system, 
trading hours and price discounts)
An independent authority on ?scal 
responsibility is set up to strengthen the ?scal 
framewor? and ensure effective compliance 
with the principle of budgetary stability.
A new framewor? is approved to promote 
business activity based on tax and SME 
?nancial support measures, reducing 
administrative burdens and fostering 
internationalisation.
In the housing mar?et, property rental 
conditions are liberalised through additional 
?exibility in contracts and in setting rents 
(removal of compulsory indexation to the 
CPI), and the tax treatment of house 
purchases is changed to ma?e it equal to 
that of house rental.
The reform of the electricity sector is 
approved.
Creation of the National Mar?ets and 
Competition Commission, in which the 
functions of the senior sectoral bodies will be 
concentrated.
LABOUR MARKET MEASURES AND OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS 2009-2013 (cont´d)
Other structural measures 
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